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Abstract
This thematic issue addresses how strategic narratives affect international order. Strategic narratives are conceived of as
stories with a political purpose or narratives used by political actors to affect the behavior of others. The articles in this
issue address two significant areas important to the study of international relations: how strategic narratives support or
undermine alliances, and how they affect norm formation and contestation.Within a post-ColdWar world and in themidst
of a changing media environment, strategic narratives affect how the world and its complex issues are understood. This
special issue speaks to the difficulties associatedwith creating creative and committed international cooperation by noting
how strategic narratives are working to shape the Post-Cold War international context.
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1. Introduction
For this issue of Politics and Governance, we issued an
invitation to examine new strategic narratives for 21st-
century global challenges. As we noted in our call for
papers, the contemporary world confronts civilizational
challenges of unprecedented complexity, which can only
be addressed through creative and committed interna-
tional cooperation. Yet, twenty-five years after the end
of the Cold War, governments and political movements
around the globe are retreating into threadbare, exclu-
sionary ethnic and nationalist narratives forged in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
We defined strategic narrative as a story with a politi-
cal purpose—often a story that can be crystallized into a
single word or phrase, such as “containment”, “democ-
ratization”, or “the global war on terror”. Such stories
provide an organizing framework for collective action,
defining a community’s identity, its values and goals, and
the stakes of its struggles. Interest in strategic narratives
builds on the narrative turn in international relations
that emphasizes the importance of narratives in shap-
ing how international order is imagined and constructed,
and the recognition that political actors attempt, under
particular circumstances and in different ways, to shape
the narratives through which sense is made of the in-
ternational system, international relations, and policy.
Most of the articles found here build on Miskimmon,
O’Loughlin andRoselle’s (2013, 2017) definition of strate-
gic narrative.
We welcomed paper submissions on a range of
methodological and thematic topics. We hoped to ex-
plore questions including:
• What are the linguistic, political, and institu-
tional processes by which strategic narratives take
shape? To what extent do narratives play a genera-
tive role in shaping strategic decisions, as opposed
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to reflecting other driving forces such as economic
self-interest?
• What factors enable certain narratives to “stick”
as organizing principles for strategic cooperation
while others fail to translate into sustained coop-
erative action?
• Why, at the present historicalmoment, are divisive
nationalist narratives more powerful than inclu-
sive ones seeking to advance regional and global
integration?
• What new narratives—and new strategies for col-
lective action—might help improve international
cooperation to address pressing challenges such
as global climate change, nuclear proliferation,
and the protection of vulnerable civilians from vio-
lence and humanitarian disasters?
The articles in this issue address the first three set of
questionsmore robustly than the fourth. The papers cho-
sen for inclusion address the dynamics of strategic nar-
rative construction and their role in policymaking in al-
liances (Roselle, 2017), how Russian strategic narratives
clash with Western European narratives of global order
(Miskimmon & O’Loughlin, 2017), what factors under-
mine BRICS strategic narrative (van Noort, 2017), how
characteristics of genocide discourses shape strategic
responses (Irvin-Erickson, 2017), and the implications
of strategic narratives associated with “normalization”
for decisions concerning international intervention or
non-intervention in civil wars and transnational conflicts
(Lemay-Hébert & Visoka, 2017).
Strikingly, we did not receive any submissions that
examined narrative strategies to enhance international
cooperation or to address pressing global challenges. In-
deed, the issue might be more aptly entitled “Narratives
of Global Disorder” rather than “Narratives of Global Or-
der”, because the papers included here seek to under-
stand narrative contestation and the sometimes unexam-
ined effects of strategic narratives. This makes sense to
us as the post-Cold War international system is in tran-
sition as is the communication technology ecology. Con-
testation is front and center.
2. How Narratives Support or Undermine Alliances
Laura Roselle’s (2017) article analyzes how strategic nar-
ratives may foster or undermine cooperation in alliances.
She examines Snyder’s (1984) notion of an alliance secu-
rity dilemma which suggests that fears of abandonment
or entrapment shape alliance behavior in certain pat-
terned ways and argues that strategic narratives play a
central role in constructing these fears. Her essay focuses
on two case studies of howUS allies and adversaries have
attempted “to use narratives to raise fears of abandon-
ment and fears of entrapment designed to change the
behavior of other actors”: first, the adoption of UN Se-
curity Council Resolution 1973 of March 2011 calling for
military intervention in Libya; and second, the Western
alliance’s imposition of punitive sanctions against Russia
during the Ukraine crisis of 2014.
In the Libyan case, France and the UK attempted
to persuade the US to cooperate in part by focusing
on system and identity narratives that emphasized com-
mon values and the need to shape the international sys-
tem. By situating the Libyan crisis within a “broader nar-
rative of a liberal order in which states have responsi-
bilities to individuals faced with authoritarian machina-
tions”, British and French leaders implied that “if the US
did not go along, it would be outside the liberal order”.
Despite serious reservations about the wisdom of mil-
itary intervention on the part of President Obama and
most of his top advisers, the fear of being “left behind”
by America’s allies ultimately convincedObama to autho-
rize military action.
While the example of Libya shows how the use of
strategic narratives can reinforce alliance cohesion by ac-
centuating fears of abandonment, the Ukraine crisis illus-
trates the converse phenomenon: an adversary’s deploy-
ment of narratives in order to undermine alliance cohe-
sion by emphasizing the risks of entrapment. In the after-
math of Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, Russian
President Vladimir Putin sought to challenge US author-
ity in the international system and undermine Western
sanctions efforts by refuting NATO’s system and identity
narratives. Putin argued that “in a post-bipolarworld, the
West, led by the US, acted selfishly, hypocritically, and
without regard for international law”. Putin’s narratives
found resonance in some Eastern European NATO mem-
ber states, where political leaders opposed sanctions on
Russia, arguing that “the US and NATO take advantage
of those who are weaker” and calling for “the support of
Christian values” as championed by Putin.
AlisterMiskimmon andBenO’Loughlin’s (2017) essay
probes in greater depth the “misalignment of narratives
about world order projected by Russia and its Western
interlocutors”. Since the beginning of Putin’s first presi-
dency in 2000, Russian leaders have consistently sought
to counteract theWestern unipolar systemnarrative that
depicts the US as the “sole remaining superpower” with
a narrative of a “polycentric world”, inwhich Russiamain-
tains great power status. According to this narrative, the
Russian Federation must be recognized as a “centre of
influence in today’s world”. In the words of Foreign Min-
ister Sergey Lavrov, a “higher level of partnership” be-
tween Russia and theWest “may be reached only on the
basis of equality, mutual respect and consideration of
each other’s interests”. This partnership requires “prag-
matism”, marked by an “understanding of our special re-
sponsibility for global stability”, rather than “tormenting
discussions about the search for general values”.
MiskimmonandO’Loughlin (2017)make the thought-
provoking claim that at this time of “rapid systemic
change, the major point of debate” between Russia and
its Western interlocutors “is the issue of recognition,
rather than domination and redistribution”. Instead of
being recognized as a “co-constitutor” of the emerging
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Post-Cold War order in Europe, “since the early 1990s
Russia has complained of being excluded from the ma-
jor decisions affecting it”, including the eastward enlarge-
ment of NATO and the European Union. The Kremlin’s
growing “frustration at this exclusion has triggered in-
creasingly assertive action…to unilaterally defend what
it perceives to be in its vital national interest”. In the
authors’ view, “events in Ukraine are at least as much
symptomas the cause of tension between Russia and the
West”, and an “underlying issue is a failure of Russia and
the West to reach a common understanding of the inter-
national system”.
Unfortunately, Miskimmon and O’Loughlin see little
immediate prospect of alleviating the narrative misalign-
ment between Russia and the West. American and Euro-
pean commentators, having previously dismissed Russia
as a declining second-rank power, now breathlessly warn
of a new Cold War against an “intransigent autocratic
state”; and recent EU and NATO policy communiqués ex-
plicitly declare that “Russia is no longer a strategic part-
ner”. Russia, meanwhile, “feels mis-recognised, but artic-
ulates a vision of world order that appears unsuited to
the dynamics of 21st-century power, shifting hierarchies
and material conditions”. This growing chasm between
the rival strategic narratives “has driven a cycle of mis-
communication, generating frustration on all sides and
restricting the scope for cooperation”.
The deterioration of relations between Russia and
the West offers an illuminating example of how the fail-
ure to achieve narrative common ground can exacerbate
international conflict by highlighting the disjuncture be-
tween the stories told by the rival sides. Carolijn van
Noort’s (2017) article on “Study of Strategic Narratives:
The Case of BRICS” examines the converse phenomenon:
the processes by which states with widely divergent
power capabilities and strategic interests seek to build
a collective identity and promote a new global order.
As van Noort (2017) points out, the nations of Brazil,
Russia, India, and China—with the subsequent addition
of South Africa—were “artificially grouped together in a
famous Goldman Sachs working paper” identifying them
as “large emerging market economies that had the po-
tential to outperform the G7 countries”. Yet, these na-
tions embraced the idea of a BRICS bloc, with ministerial
meetings in 2006 and the first BRIC Summit with heads
of states in 2009.
This article traces the strategic narrative processes of
the BRICS nations through analysis of joint communiqués
and identifies a system narrative of global recovery, an
identity narrative of inclusive participation, and an issue
narrative of infrastructural development. An important
addition to the literature on strategic narratives is van
Noort’s focus on the narrative environment of symbolic,
institutional and material practices. Interestingly, the
conclusion reached here is about the very mixed success
of a unifying BRICS strategic narrative. What arguably
undermines the coherence of this narrative is “that the
coalition, and the NDB [New Development Bank] more
specifically, are being shaped in ways that favor the in-
terests and values of the two autocratic members” (Ab-
denur & Folly, 2015, p. 88; Kiely, 2016, p. 33). The themes
of good governance and development divide the issue
narrative therefore into two camps: the “IBSA” countries
(Brazil, India, South Africa) in the one camp, and Russia
and China in the other.
3. Narratives, Norm Formation, and Conflict
While the first three articles in the issue examine how
system and identity narratives can drive conflict or coop-
eration among states or groups of states, the final two
essays explore hownarratives about global norms are de-
ployed to justify or resist demands for military interven-
tion. Douglas Irvin-Erickson (2017) presents the concept
of “genocide discourses”—a type of strategic narrative
built on the principles that “the victims of genocide are
necessarily moral innocents, not parties in conflict” and
that “genocidal systems are dislodged only when they
are swept away through external violence”. These dual
principles make genocide discourses “highly effective in
conferringmoral capital upon certain actors in a conflict”.
By casting “the perpetrators as evil” and “the victims as
innocent”, such narratives “prescribe external violence
as the only means of defending the good”.
Genocide discourses, writes Irvin-Erickson, can play
a powerful role in “motivating humanitarian responses
in defense of certain groups, or sustaining popular sup-
port for foreign wars”. In their most extreme form, “a
kind of reciprocal genocide becomes the imagined so-
lution to genocide, insofar as the total annihilation of
a supposedly evil social group is presented as the only
way to prevent the total annihilation of a supposedly
pure and innocent victim group”. As case studies, Irvin-
Erickson analyzes the dueling narratives of victimization
told by Ukrainian and Russian leaders about the conflict
between their countries, as well as the debates in the
United States over Islamic State genocides in Iraq.
The final article in the special issue, by Nicolas Lemay-
Hébert and Gezim Visoka (2017), speaks to the con-
sequences of particular strategic narratives as they ar-
gue that “the language of normalization, hidden be-
hind…narratives of interventions, has…contributed to
structure the intervention landscape”. Normalcy and nor-
malization within peace and conflict studies is used as
“a normative goal of peacebuilding, as an intermedi-
ary measurement of success towards sustainable peace,
or as a processual mechanism facilitating other post-
conflict processes”. The authors suggest that normal-
ization can be understood as a strategic narrative and
that there are three modes of normalization: imposing
normalcy, restoring normalcy, and accepting normalcy.
These three are taken together as the concept of nor-
mal peace, “a new conceptual reference to understand
interventions undertaken by the international commu-
nity to impose, restore or accept normalcy in turbu-
lent societies”.
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Lemay-Hébert and Visoka (2017) argue that impos-
ing normalcy can be seen as creating liberal subjects,
and the measurement becomes state “performance”;
restoring normalcy is set on building resilient subjects
and a return to the status quo; and accepted normalcy
“where international actors seek tomanage risks through
recognition of the plurality of ways of life”. This seem-
ingly abstract debate over definitions can have weighty
political and military consequences: countries such as
Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, which are judged by interna-
tional policy elites to be “normal” despite engaging in
“widespread torture and human rights abuses”, are able
to avoid punitive action. But other states such as Soma-
lia or Afghanistan, which are deemed “abnormal”, may
be subjected to the deployment of international peace-
keeping forces or even full-scale invasion. At heart the au-
thors note the importance of understanding how knowl-
edge production and strategic narratives shape the exer-
cise of power on the global stage.
4. Conclusion
At a historical moment when the international system
is in flux, the analysis of strategic narratives provides a
productive lens for understanding this ongoing transfor-
mation. The articles in this issue illuminate the central
role of storytelling in a wide range of decision-making
processes in international affairs—from alliance forma-
tion to norm formation and conflict. Thus, these arti-
cles speak to the idea that narratives shape how in-
ternational issues, and the international system itself,
are understood.
The analysis of strategic narratives is critical for un-
derstanding certain processes (e.g. alliance formation)
that are often taken for granted. Careful attention to nar-
ratives allows one to examine the underlying assump-
tions upon which behavior in the international system
takes place. In a post-ColdWar international system, nar-
rative contestation is the focus of scholars as political ac-
tors seek to create an ordering principle within which al-
liances ‘make sense’, conflicts among nations are waged,
and a 21st-century international order takes shape.
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